Private tutoring is known to be pervasive in many parts of the world, and yet has received scanty attention from economists. This paper empirically examines the determinants of the demand for private tutoring in South Korea, where the thriving and expanding industry of private tutoring industry already constitutes a major conduit for education alongside formal schooling. Korean households spend about 2.9% of GDP on private tutoring at the primary and secondary levels, a figure within striking distance of 3.4% in public expenditure for formal schooling. This paper presents econometric evidence that lower school quality stimulates demand for private tutoring significantly. The result supports the view that institutional features in student's learning environments are among the key driving factors for the demand for the shadow education, and not just high-stakes tests and academic achievement incentives. The result is also in line with the view that the mushrooming of private tutoring is a natural market response to underprovided and overregulated formal schooling in Korea.
Introduction
The thriving industry of private tutoring already constitutes a major conduit for education alongside formal schooling in South Korea (Korea, henceforth). Korean households spent 2.9% of GDP on private tutoring for children at the primary and secondary levels in 1998.
The amount is within striking distance of total public expenditure for formal schooling at the same levels, which stood at 3.4% of GDP. Household spending for private tutoring has been growing at a remarkable pace, from 0.9% of GDP to 1. 2% in 1990, 1.8% in 1994, and 2.9% in 1998. While one might welcome private tutoring to the extent that it brings additional resources to human capital accumulation, the chief problem is that it is expensive, and that not every family can afford it. It is small wonder that private tutoring occupies a prominent spot in the Korean agenda for policy debates amid concerns that such heavy reliance on private tutoring will perpetuate or even exacerbate the widening income gap across generations.
While such a massive development of private tutoring industry as Korea has experienced is without many precedents, private tutoring is known to be pervasive in many parts of the world. Bray (1999) documents heavy incidence of private tutoring not just in East Asian countries of Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Korea, but also in a large swathe of developing countries from Brazil to Zimbabwe. There are also signs that private tutoring is increasing in English-speaking countries.
1
Despite widespread practice of outside-school tutoring and its critical policy implications, academic research in the area has been scanty, especially among economists. Scholars often echo the popular speculation and attribute international variations in the market demand for tutoring to high-stakes tests and national achievement incentives. (Bray (1999) ; Baker et al. (2001) ; Stevenson and Baker (1992) ) From the standpoint of East Asian experiences, 1 A recent survey of 3,000 primary and secondary school students in England showed 27% of them had a private tutor.(http://news.bbc.co.uk/cbbcnews/hi/uk/) Under the No Child Left Behind Act, parents in the US have two options if their children are enrolled in high-poverty schools that have not met academic benchmarks for three consecutive years: Their children can transfer to better-performing schools or receive free after-school tutoring, including from private companies.(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/) About 24% of Ontario parents with school-aged children have recently hired tutors (Livingstone, Hart and Davey, 2003) and 50% of all Canadian parents claim they would hire a tutor if it was affordable. (Davies, 2002) where countries have post-secondary entrance exams, major status differences among postsecondary institutions, and direct labor market rewards for entry into those institutions, the conjecture seems certainly plausible.
However, one systematic evaluation of international cross-section data, indeed the only such study in the literature to my best knowledge, suggests that it is institutional factors of education, including limited accessibility and lower funding, that drive the demand for outside-school shadow education, instead of high-stakes tests and social incentives for scholastic achievement. (Baker, Akiba, LeTendre, and Wiseman (2001) ) 2 This paper presents evidence that lower school quality significantly increases the demand for private tutoring in Korea. While the results do not necessarily imply that high-stakes exams are not a factor in the unusually high demand for private tutoring in the country, they are in line with the conclusion, reached by Baker, Akiba, LeTendre, and Wiseman (2001) , that institutional factors in school environments are the key factors driving the demand for tutoring. The results also support the view that strengthening incentives in the formal education system can reduce the demand substantially.
The empirical analysis utilizes the data from the Korea National Assessment of Educational Achievement (NAEA) 2001. The NAEA cross-section covers roughly 1% of the nation's high school students in grades 10 and 11, and contains detailed information on student achievement in various subjects as well as information on students' family backgrounds, and school and teacher characteristics. The study supplements the NAEA data with a measure of school productivity derived from a separate panel data set containing standardized test scores. The supplementary panel data allows me to calculate the change in standardized test scores for individual students and school averages of those changes, which I interpret as a measure of individual school productivity.
Econometric evidence based on the data suggests that demand for private tutoring is significantly higher for students attending schools where productivity is lower, mean score is lower, and dispersion of scores is larger, among other findings.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a primer on the secondary education and private tutoring in Korea to establish the backgrounds. Section 3 introduces the data. The main results are reported in Section 4, to be followed by concluding remarks in the final section.
2 Backgrounds: Secondary education and private tutoring in Korea
This section presents a brief synopsis of the modern secondary education in Korea, focusing on aspects necessary for understanding of the main results to be discussed later. Readers interested in a more detailed treatment are referred to Godo (2002) , which documents the historical development of modern education in Korea and meticulously traces the accumulation of education stock among the adult population in Korea, and to Kim and Lee (2002 b) , which provides a critical review of the government's current education policies.
Standardized school system and expansion of the education sector
Aggregate indicators for Korean education are quite impressive, especially for a developing country that used to be counted among international basket cases a few decades ago. In 2002, 9 years of schooling up to lower secondary education is mandatory and free. High school education, for students in grades 10 to 12 after 6 years of elementary education and 3 years in lower-secondary, middle schools, is also almost universal with modest tuitions. Apart from the gradually improving quality of schools, perhaps a major factor stimulating the demand for more schooling on the part of parents was the government-enforced standardization of the educational curriculum and the schools. Not only public but also private schools are mandated to follow the unified national curriculum, up to grade 12. The unified curriculum is taught using either designated or certified textbooks, accompanied by thick volumes of teachers' guides. At the level of middle and high schools, student tuition and teacher compensation are virtually even across the board, again regardless of whether the school is public or private. One can easily imagine many problems that are to be inevitably engendered by the consequent lack of diversity. Still, standardization was presumably instrumental in assuaging parental concerns arising from asymmetric information on school quality.
3 At the same time, standardized classes in standardized schools should cost less to provide.
Private tutoring and the Equalization Policy
Despite the apparent success, the government's education ministry has been subjected to waves of criticism. Part of the frustration reflects the changes in the nature of labor demanded from the maturing Korean economy: overall, the heavily regulated schools are not well suited for turning out a sophisticated and creative workforce. However, the criticism has been increasingly directed at one particular target: pyong-jun-hwa, or the "Equalization" of secondary schools, which has remained the cornerstone of the Korean secondary education policy since its introduction in the early 1970s.
In 1974, the EP was first introduced in Seoul and Pusan, the two largest metropolitan areas in Korea, and has been expanded since to cover more and more urban areas. 4 Replacing the traditional entrance examinations at individual high schools, the EP uses lottery to randomly assign middle school graduates to high schools within enrollment districts. 5 The major goal of the EP was to control the growth of private tutoring among children preparing for entrance exams at prestigious middle and high schools.
In spite of mounting criticisms, the EP continues to expand, in part spurred by the strong pro-EP campaigns by the newly legalized national teachers' union. In March 2002, six additional cities in the suburbs of Seoul joined the EP regime. This latest round of expansion was set to increase the coverage up to 57 percent of general high schools and 74 percent of general high school students.
The remaining regions outside the EP regime have retained the traditional student enrollment system, where individual schools select new students based on competitive entrance exams. Well-established rankings exist among high schools, reflecting track records in placing their graduates into elite universities. Entrance exams effectively sort students into schools based on academic achievement in the non-EP areas.
It is important to note the drastic extent to which the EP bolsters mixing of students 4 Local government in Korea breaks down into 7 metropolitan areas (Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Inchon, Kwangju, Taejon, and Ulsan), each with population over 1 million, and 9 provinces. Provinces in turn comprise 72 provincial cities and 91 counties as of 2001.
across schools and classrooms with an assortment of accompanying measures regulating private schools, tracking among and within schools, school finances, curriculum and teacher policies, and school administration.
In 2001, 47 percent of high schools are private and 54 percent of high school students attend private schools in the country. These high figures mask the important fact that the EP practically turned private schools into public in the policy areas. The lottery-based enrollment applies to private schools as well as public. A standing mandate requires that teachers' salaries and student tuitions in private schools should be the same as those in public schools. The government has stood by its commitment to subsidizing private school finance as necessary. All this means that private schools, in spite of their large number, are not in a position to serve as a conduit for school choice, at least in the EP areas.
In secondary education across the world, tracking is prevalent, both among and within schools. Many countries offer separate educational tracks at the secondary level for students who would enter the labor market directly and those who would pursue post-secondary education. So is the case with Korea: vocational high schools for the former, accounting for 31 percent of student enrollment in 2001, and general high for the latter. While vocational high schools do conduct entrance exams, whether in EP or non-EP areas, they cannot be expected to promote school choice: Historically, vocational schools enroll students from the lower end of achievement distribution.
6 Our subsequent analysis focuses on general high schools, ignoring vocational high.
Tracking may also occur within school. In the U.S., intensive tracking within school is widespread. In a sharp contrast, Korean schools admit virtually no intramural tracking.
7
Classroom setting in general high schools hardly differs from that in elementary schools.
Every student in general high schools takes the same, predetermined sequence of classes without changing classrooms.
6 In a brief exception to this general pattern, vocational schools attracted a fairly large crop of ambitious students during the 1970s, when the government was energetically promoting heavy and chemical industries.
7 The only exception is for the bifurcation from grade 11 to accommodate students intending to study science and engineering in college and those to study humanities and social sciences.
Local finance of public schools could promote school choice through residential sorting.
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Prior to the introduction of the EP, however, public school finance had already been integrated nationwide. The EP added all private schools, across the country, into the existing system of centralized public school finance. The possibility of residential sorting through Tiebout choice, then, is fairly strictly limited.
9
Uniform and centralized policies over curriculum and teachers' qualifications have also made Korean schools extremely indistinguishable from each other. Instruction is to be provided according to unified national curriculum, based on either designated or certified textbooks and dictated by thick volumes of teachers' guidelines. Teachers in public schools are all public employees of the national government with uniform salary schedules and required qualifications. Private school teachers should also meet the same qualifications required by the government and are also guaranteed with the equivalent salary schedules and other benefits by the government.
10 Even after 1981, when most educational administration over schools was theoretically devolved to local governments, the top-down and hands-on administration by the bureaucracy over schools remained.
11
8 There is an ongoing debate over the effects of court-mandated statewide equalization of school finances (Benabou, 1994) . Hoxby (2000) reports that school choice facilitated by smaller-sized school districts in the US does promote competition and innovation among schools.
9 An often-noted exception is the popularity of certain zones within Seoul, famous for the concentration of private cram schools and professional private tutors. For this and other reasons to be explained shortly, we focus on schools in provincial cities in our empirical analysis.
10 Perhaps the only significant difference is that teachers in public schools are rotated across schools at a 5-6 year interval. Teachers in private schools tend to stay with the same school.
11 How may one explain the fact that all these strict regulations were able to take hold in Korea? While referring interested readers to Kim and Lee (2002 b) for more detailed discussion on this issue, we briefly note the following observations. First, we have to remember that Korea in the 1970s was the very picture of a developmental state with government in the lead and people largely willing to follow. Second, the EP may have been effective in meeting the rising demands for industrial labor in mid 1970s. Through standardization, the EP helped expand the high school enrollment: from 41 percent in 1975 to 80 percent in 1985. Lastly, concerns had been rising prior to the introduction of the EP about excessive pressure placed on young children in middle schools and about mushrooming costs for private tutoring. While it is debatable whether the EP relieved pressure on the young children, the policy merely shifted demands for private tutoring until a later stage. presents evidence that spending on private tutoring is higher in EP-areas after controlling for other variables.
3 Data and empirical strategy
Data
The main data analyzed in the next section come from the Korean National Assessment of Educational Achievement (NAEA) 2001. The core of the NAEA consists of individual test scores on five subjects, Korean, English, math, science, and Social Studies.
12 The tests were administered on a 1% nationally representative sample of students in grades 6, 9, 10, and
11.
13 As high schools in Korea instruct students in grades from 10 to 12, the paper utilizes mainly the portion of data pertaining to grades 10 and 11.
14 Supplementing the individual test scores are surveys answered by student examinees and by teachers responsible for instruction in the subjects tested. Teacher surveys provide essential information on school characteristics and teacher characteristics. School characteristics include location, being public or private, being coed or gender-segregated, whether the region is subject to equalization, size of the school, and size of the class tested. Teacher characteristics include age, education, teaching experience, and workload.
While student surveys do provide some bare essentials on family characteristics, such as parental education and whether the mother has a job outside home, some of the usual family background variables, such as income, occupation, and age of parents, are not provided.
Students do report, however, their use of time after school, including hours spent on selfstudy and hours spent to receive private tutoring. The information on private tuition is obviously crucial for the purpose of this paper.
12 These tests are not of high stakes because they are not linked to any policy measures affecting school administrators, teachers, and students. Results regarding individual students or schools are released neither to the test participants and nor to the general public.
13 Sampling for the test was conducted in two stages. The first stage selected classes through stratified sampling based on region and class size. Then the second stage selected individual examinees based on cluster sampling.
14 The NAEA 2001 is a part of the ongoing government project to develop assessment instruments eventually to be used for mandated evaluation of school performance according to predetermined national standards. The test instruments for the NAEA 2001 were developed through pilot tests implemented earlier. It is expected that the government will carry out similar assessments in the future. The mission and the nature of the Korean NAEA are similar to those of the American NAEP (National Assessment of Educational Progress).
In addition to vocational schools and general high schools, Korea also has a relatively small number of special-purpose schools designed to spot early on, and train, talented students in such areas as arts, sports, science, and languages.
15 I drop vocational as well as special-purpose schools from the sample, since the two school classes are fundamentally distinguished from the more usual general schools in terms of purposes and contents of instruction and student selection mechanism. From the initial number of observations of 15,054, this consideration selects 10,581 students in general high schools. Also dropped are students for whom not all the information to be analyzed in estimation is available. These exclusions leave us with 8,738 individual students. Let us call this group sample 1.
The study supplements the NAEA data with a measure of school productivity derived Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables in the two samples. While sample 2 is obviously smaller of the two, the differences seem minor. We note that sample 1 includes relatively more public schools and female students than sample 2, but the differences are within the range of sampling errors. Table 1 includes four school-level variables that we take to be indicators of the quality 15 Special-purpose schools are not only allowed a higher level of autonomy in the setting of tuition and the design of instruction formats, but also left free to select students from across the country using independently designed tests. Science and language schools are a great attraction for bright college-bound students, but their numbers are so far limited to 18 for language schools and 16 for science schools, respectively, compared to 1,199 general schools across the country. of learning environment. ∆z, included in sample 2 but not in sample 1, measures schoollevel value added in terms of academic performance improvement of the students enrolled at a given school. School mean score reflects the general level of academic preparedness of the student peers. School standard deviation measures the dispersion in the test scores at a school. The more diverse students are in terms of their academic preparedness, the more difficult it will be for teachers to adequately meet differing learning needs of individual students, which we expect to increase the demand for remedial private tutoring outside school.
In the Korean context, we expect learning environment in public schools to be lower than in private schools in general. This is not due to resource advantages enjoyed by students and teachers in private schools. We noted earlier that private and public schools are indistinguishable in terms of student fees, overall school finance, and curriculum under the standardized regimen of formal schooling in Korea. In areas under the EP, students are even randomly assigned between public and private schools. The key difference between private and public schools in Korea is that teachers, including principals, have a limited term to serve at a school before being rotated to another public school. This may weaken sense of belonging to a particular school on the part of teachers in the public school rotation system. This may also make it difficult for principals to establish authority among teachers he or she must lead and supervise. Table 2 provides a first-glance look at the distribution of self-study and private tutoring hours per day for the whole country and for different locations. Self-study hours average about 1.2 hours per day across the country, and there is little variation across different locales, namely Seoul, other metropolitan cities, small cities, and rural areas. In contrast, incidence of private tutoring hours varies significantly across locales, and occurs more heavily in the order of Seoul, other metropolitan cities, small cities, and rural areas. We also note that the average private tutoring hours are higher than the average self-study hours.
Empirical methodology
The following section presents two sets of econometric results. The first is based on a plain linear regression model, and estimates the reduced-form demand equation for hours in private tutoring (pt). The equation is estimated by OLS on two samples, sample 1 and sample 2 defined above. The dependent variable is hours per day spent in private tutoring. The explanatory variables include four school-level variables, ∆z, public school dummy, school mean score, and school standard deviation; individual student's standardized test score, test score squared, grade 11 dummy and gender; mother's and father's educational attainment and dummies for residential locale 17 to control for differences in family backgrounds.
The second set of results intend to model structural determinants of demand for private tutoring. The set-up models an individual student trying to efficiently allocate his total study hours (T ) between private tutoring (p) and self-study (s). For simplicity, let us assume that the student allocates his study time to maximize academic achievement. The student's task boils down to locating a point along the time budget line (T = p + s) that maximizes academic achievement. Note that the absolute value of the slope of the budget line is one.
Depending on the student's production technology, we can envisage three qualitatively 
Again for simplicity, assume that MRTS is a linear function of the arguments.
where X is a list of variables including school, student, and family characteristics, and follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 . Then the log-likelihood function log L to be maximized is given as follows.
See Figure 2 . Factors in X that increase the MRTS tilt the isoquants clockwise and push out the optimal choice to the right along the time budget line, increasing the demand for private tutoring. Factors that decrease the MRTS tilt the isoquants counterclockwise and push in the optimal choice to the left along the time budget, decreasing the demand for private tutoring. Students attending public schools, where we argued earlier that limited terms of teachers and principals are likely to reduce effectiveness of teaching, are shown to receive significantly more hours of tutoring. Higher-quality student peers, as measured by higher school means scores, tend to reduce the demand for outside-school tutoring. Higher dispersion in students' academic achievement significantly increases the demand for tutoring.
Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations show that estimated impacts of the school factors are substantial. For instance, based on results reported in column 1, one standard deviation improvement in ∆z may decrease the demand by 7 minutes. Improving governance at public schools to the level obtaining in private schools may reduce the demand by about 14 minutes. One standard deviation improvement in school mean score may reduce the demand by about 5 minutes. One standard deviation reduction in school standard deviation may reduce the demand by about 3.5 minutes. Given that the average hours of private tutoring is about 80 minutes, these results do suggest that improving school learning environments can significantly cut back the demand for private tutoring. Table 4 presents maximum likelihood estimation results of the model described earlier.
The model traces how explanatory variables affect the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) of hours in private tutoring for hours of self-study. It is reassuring that the signs of estimated coefficients are identical between Table 3 and Table 4 . Factors that positively impact on the MRTS tilt the isoquants clockwise, pushing out the optimal choice to the right and below along the time budget line, thus increasing the demand for private tutoring.
Concluding Remarks
Private tutoring is known to be pervasive in many parts of the world, and yet has received scanty attention from economists. This paper empirically examined the determinants of the demand for private tutoring in South Korea, where the thriving and expanding industry of private tutoring industry already constitutes a major conduit for education alongside formal schooling.
The evidence reported in the paper strongly suggests that lower school quality significantly increases the demand for private tutoring. Low quality in some of the nation's schools is a significant driving factor, if not the only one, for the mushrooming incidence of private tutoring. The result supports the view that institutional features in student's learning environments are among the key driving factors for the demand for the shadow education, and not just high-stakes tests and academic achievement incentives. (Baker et. al., 2001) The result is also in line with the view that the mushrooming of private tutoring is a natural market response to underprovided and overregulated formal schooling in Korea. (Kim and Lee, 2002a) 
